Internet Slander Law | Posting Defamatory Comments Could Subject You In Another State

Be careful who you defame, and where you defame them.  If they are located in a far away state, you might be dragged into court and sued for online defamation in a far away state.  You probably don't know an internet slander attorney there.  And it is going to cost you money to defend the case. 

In Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C., v. Roberts, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2551, Justice Pfeifer writing for the Ohio Supreme Court examined the issue of whether an Ohio court can properly assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when jurisdiction is predicated on that defendant’s publication of allegedly defamatory statements on the Internet.

His conclusion in this online defamation case? Personal jurisdiction is proper over Roberts the nonresident defendant.

The parties involved;

Appellee, Kauffman Racing Equipment, L.L.C. (KRE) is an Ohio limited liability company that constructs engine blocks and related high-performance automotive equipment for public sale. Although its business dealings are nationwide, KRE maintains its sole business operations and office in Glenmont, Ohio. {¶ 2}

Appellant, Scott Roberts, is a 30-year resident of Virginia who has never physically entered Ohio. {¶ 3}

Roberts purchased an MR-1 Pontiac engine block from KRE and was dissatisfied. As a result, from October 18, 2006, through November 2006, Roberts posted numerous rancorous criticisms of KRE on various websites devoted to automobile racing equipment and related subjects. His commentary appeared on the public-forum section of the websites PerformanceYears.com and PontiacStreetPerformance.com and in an item description on the Internet auction website, eBay Motors. {¶ 3}, {¶ 6}

This post on eBay where Roberts listed the block for sale aptly summarizes the attitude of his allegedly defamatory posts about KRE;

“This is a Kauffman MR-1 Block. It has some real issues. * * * Steve Kaufmann [sic] says it’s the best aftermarket block out there for a Pontiac, but I now know better. * * * Basically this block is junk and I have bought an IAII block to replace it. It has never been assembled. * * * Also the service you would get from Steve Kauffman of K&M performance is less than honorable. I brought the issues to his attention and he basically gave me the middle fingersalute.” {¶ 15}

Personal Jurisdiction over a defendant who is a resident of a different state;

The Ohio S.C. noted that personal jurisdiction is a question of law and that Kauffman Racing Equipment (KRE) bore the burden to demonstrate that personal jurisdiction over defendant Roberts by the Ohio trial court was proper. However, the court also iterated that “because the trial court decided Roberts’s Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion,” (to dismiss) “upon written submissions and without an evidentiary hearing, KRE had to make only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” {¶ 27}

The Ohio Supreme Court avoided narrowing the scope of its analysis by noting that the Zippo test, often found referenced in Internet slander law, was inapplicable to the instant case. The Zippo test arose from the case of Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. (W.D.Pa.1997), 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124, and has been employed to determine whether Internet activity between the defendant and the forum state establishes jurisdiction using a “sliding scale” approach. However, the Zippo test was meant to apply to examining issues within a commercial or business context and as this court points out in its analysis, this makes the Zippo case “factually distinct from this case.” {¶ 26}

For more a quick aside to an exploration of personal jurisdiction over defendants outside of your home state, Zippo, Hansen, and WWVolkswagen, check this out;

• Internet Lawyer Update: Personal Service over Foreign Corporations,

 

Back to KRE v. Roberts– After rejecting the Zippo test’s application to the current case, the court then embarked on a traditional two step analysis of personal jurisdiction;

1. "Whether the longarm statute and the applicable rule of civil procedure confer jurisdiction, and if so,
2. Whether the exercise of jurisdiction would deprive the nonresident defendant of the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” {¶ 28}

In examining the first prong of its traditional personal jurisdiction test, the court enumerated a number of factors which played heavily into its determination of this issue;

• “Despite the fact that Roberts’s publication of his comments did not emanate from Ohio, those comments were received in Ohio. KRE submitted evidence that at least five Ohio residents had seen the comments posted by Roberts.” {¶ 41}

• “Because Roberts’s allegedly defamatory statements were published in Ohio, his alleged tort was committed in Ohio, and he falls within the grasp” of Ohio’s long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382. {¶ 29}

• “Even if we assume that Roberts’s alleged tortious conduct did not take place within the territorial boundaries of Ohio, he nonetheless “might reasonably have expected that [KRE] would be injured in this state.” {¶ 44}

Analysis of the first prong of the traditional personal jurisdiction test applied to defendant Roberts is nicely summed up by Pfeifer here;

“When defamatory statements regarding an Ohio plaintiff are made outside the state yet with the purpose of causing injury to the Ohio resident and there is a reasonable expectation that the purposefully inflicted injury will occur in Ohio, the requirements of R.C. 2307.382(A)(6) are satisfied. It is clear from the postings that Roberts’s statements were made with the purpose of injuring KRE. Therefore, the long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Roberts in Ohio.” {¶ 44}

Pfeifer found this reasonable expectation of defendant Robert’s purposefully inflicted injuries occurring in Ohio to be sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis.

With the longarm statute conferring personal jurisdiction, Pfeifer began examination of the second prong of his personal jurisdiction analysis;

He noted that this is necessary because “although Ohio’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over Roberts, an Ohio court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Roberts if doing so would violate his constitutional right to due process. {¶ 45}

Justice Pfeifer then made sure to include reference to the U.S.S.C. case of International Shoe. International Shoe set the standard that due process is satisfied by a defendant who has “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that bringing suit within the forum state would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154” {¶ 45}

Minimum contacts analysis led Pfeifer to apply the Hansen test. The minimum contacts requirement is met when a nonresident defendant “purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228. {¶ 45}

In continuing his analysis of the due process second prong and now addressing personal availment in terms of due process and specific jurisdiction under the S. Machine Co. test;

Pfeifer adopts the three-part test from S. Machine Co., 401 F.2d at 381, to use in determining whether specific jurisdiction here is consistent with due process. {¶ 50}

The first factor of the Machine test focuses on purposeful availment. It is whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. {¶ 51}

Pfeifer relied on reference to the U.S.S.C. case of Calder v. Jones, (1984), 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, to examine the first Machine factor. In Calder, the Court examined purposeful availment in regards to jurisdiction in a defamation case. “They knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances, petitioners must ‘reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there’ to answer for the truth of the statements made in their article. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490” {¶ 52}

Applying Calder and WWVolks to KRE v. Roberts, “Roberts intended the effects of his conduct to be felt in Ohio. His statements were communicated with the very purpose of having their consequences felt by KRE in Ohio…The postings themselves indicate his purpose of injuring Kauffman…Many of the postings name Kauffman directly and specifically mention Ohio.” {¶ 67}

It appears that when viewed in the light most favorable to KRE and when resolving all reasonable competing inferences in favor of KRE, the evidence shows that Roberts intentionally and tortiously sought to harm KRE’s reputation and negatively affect its contracts and business relationships. {¶ 69}

The second prong of the Machine test involves an analysis of whether KRE’s claims arise from those contacts. “This criterion requires only ‘that the cause of action, of whatever type, have a substantial connection with the defendant's in-state activities.” {¶ 70}

Pfeifer found that KRE has made a prima facie showing that the cause of action arose from Roberts’s contacts with Ohio. He highlighted that;

“Not only does the cause of action arise from defamatory statements, those statements themselves are predicated on the business dealings between Roberts and KRE. The catalyst for Roberts’s actions was his Ohio contacts. In fact, but for his contacts with Ohio, Roberts’s allegedly defamatory statements would not have been posted.” {¶ 70}

The third and final prong of the Machine test requires that the acts of the nonresident defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial connection with the forum state to make exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. {¶ 71}

Pfeifer equates this third prong to a reasonableness inquiry and assesses both KRE’s and (possibly more importantly) Ohio’s interest in the suit. He finds that KRE and Ohio both maintain a clear interest in KRE’s obtaining the relief sought, the reasonableness factor is satisfied and finally that Ohio is the appropriate forum.

In conclusion, Pfeifer left us with this;

“Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to KRE, we conclude that Ohio’s long-arm statute and the applicable rule of civil procedure confer jurisdiction over Roberts and that an exercise of jurisdiction of the trial court would not deprive this nonresident defendant of the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” {¶ 74}

The dissent;

Justices O’Donnell and Lanzinger disagreed with the majority’s application of Calder. They noted that in Calder “the court stressed not only the location of the injury but also the “pervasive nature” of the Enquirer’s reach in California – particularly given the fact that its circulation there, at 600,000, was twice that in any other state.” The dissent distinguished Calder by noting that the reach of Roberts’s comments to Ohio residents is not at all comparable to the reach of the National Enquirer’s circulation to California residents. Further, O’Donnell went on to warn that “the practical impact of the majority’s holding in this case is to unnecessarily chill the exercise of free speech.” {¶ 81}

This newest court ruling on internet law expands the scope of personal jurisdiction for Ohio State courts further into content posted online. The ensuing ramifications of this expansive ruling on Internet slander and defamation law have yet to play themselves out but it will be interesting to see how both Internet Lawyers and subsequent court rulings will handle this case.

This case, related information and further discussion can be found here;

Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C., v. Roberts, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2551,

Ohio high court extends libel reach to Virginia resident,

Ohio Supreme Court Rules Commenter in Virginia Can Be Brought to Court in Ohio